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Business-government relations on trade issues are generally characterized as 
protectionist lobbying or – less often – lobbying for the liberalization of markets. 
However, with the evolution of the trading system, negotiations today concern not just 
market opening, but also the regulatory frameworks that structure international trade. 
This transformation has important consequences for the ways in which private 
interests can contribute to trade negotiations. Instead of simply trying to exert 
pressure, businesses and other private actors now form working relationships with 
governments based on expertise, learning, and information exchange. This article 
illustrates these new forms of public-private interactions with examples from the U.S., 








International trade negotiations have changed profoundly in the last 50 years. 
Since the first rounds of talks under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
[GATT], trade negotiations have moved from the reciprocal reduction of tariff 
barriers to include a wealth of non-tariff barriers, focusing increasingly on domestic 
issues with an impact on trade. The Uruguay Round led to the creation of the World 
Trade Organization [WTO] in 1995 and expanded the coverage of the multilateral 
trading system to services and intellectual property rights. Trade-related domains, 
such as environment or labor standards, competition or investment policies are also 
affected by the rules negotiated under the WTO (see Hoekman & Kostecki, 2001; 
Barton, Goldstein, Josling, & Steinberg, 2006). With the expansion of trade issues, 
new non-governmental groups have tried to take part in trade negotiations in order to 
off-set the influence of big business (Bayne & Woolcock, 2003). Indeed, activists and 
the anti-globalization movements have argued that the WTO is captured by big 
business, which maintain apparently privileged relationships with trade negotiators 
(e.g. Wallach & Sforza, 1999; Wesselius, 2002).  
Business-government relations have been central to academic writing on trade 
policy for a long time. According to the school of economic regulation, which still 
dominates trade policy studies today, trade decisions are the result of industry 
lobbying (Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974; Buchanan, Tollison, & Tullock, 1980; Krueger, 
1995). In most trade policy accounts, business is assumed to determine first where its 
material interests lie: in the protection of home markets or in the access to new 
markets (Frieden & Martin, 2002: 126). It then tries to influence political decision-
makers, offering votes or financial incentives in exchange for the desired outcome. 
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Within this framework, understanding the making of trade policy implies 
understanding when firms would lobby for protectionism and when for liberalization, 
and sophisticated models have been developed to predicting industry behavior 
according to factor distribution, sectors or firm strategies (Alt & Gilligan, 1994; 
Milner, 1999; Hiscox, 2002).2 
An empirical study of current business-government interactions, however, 
reveals a more complex reality. First of all, firms maintain a great variety of relations 
with governments that go far beyond making general demands for open or closed 
markets. Depending on the sectors, governments may solicit firm input and even 
delegate tasks to business actors (Cutler, Haufler, & Porter, 1999). Second, business-
government relations often take the form of close working relationships, characterized 
by the mutually beneficial exchange of information and reciprocal learning (Shaffer, 
2003; Woll, 2005). Even though firms sometimes know exactly what they want and 
then pressure their governments to comply with these interests, business-government 
relations go further beyond simple pressure lobbying than previously assumed in the 
international political economy literature on trade.  
The central argument of this paper is that traditional business-government 
models fail to capture an increasingly complex empirical reality, because they are 
based on an outdated and sometimes inaccurate conception the nature of trade 
negotiations. Pressure lobbying for protectionism or liberalization, as appropriate as it 
may be for tariff negotiations (e.g. Kingstone, 2000), does not account for strategies 
related to the new dynamics and complex issues negotiated under the WTO. The 
liberalization of trade in products has moved the target of business lobbyists from 
tariffs to process and production methods - and therefore to environment and labor 
standards - even though subsidies, and lately safeguards remain an important issue 
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(Hoekman & Kostecki, 2001:453; Read, 2005).3 Recent trading issues increasingly 
imply the construction or harmonization of specific regulatory regimes, especially in 
new areas such as intellectual property or service trade (Sauvé & Stern, 2000; Mattoo 
& Sauvé, 2003). This not only applies to multilateral agreements, such as the WTO’s 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, the Technical Barriers to Trade 
Agreement, or elements of the General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS], it 
has also been particularly true in the case of bilateral agreements since 2001.1 In this 
context, business-government relations resemble the interactions of firms and 
governments on domestic regulatory issues and not the pressure lobbying on tariff 
negotiations or safeguards (see Willman, Coen, Currie, & Sinner, 2003; Coen, 2005). 
In addition, the judicialization or legalization of trade issues through the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO increases the role of expertise as a primary resource of 
business lobbying (Shaffer, 2006).  
While the literature acknowledges the changing nature of trade, few authors 
have fully acknowledged the profound effect of these transformations for business-
government interactions (but see Shaffer, 2003; Young & Peterson, 2006). This article 
seeks to fill this void.  It distinguishes two ideal types of business lobbying – pressure 
lobbying and interactive business-government relations, the latter which we will refer 
to as regulatory trade lobbying. It discusses why pressure lobbying is inappropriate in 
the context of regulatory issues and the increasing legalization of trade. We then 
illustrate the new business-government relations with case examples from the United 
States, the European Union, and the emerging trade power Brazil. In particular, we 
highlight that interactive lobbying happens in a context of uncertainty, that 
                                                 
1
 In the case of Latin America, free-trade agreements signed with the US have progressively included 
areas beyond WTO standards, inspired by the NAFTA (Roffe and Santa Cruz , 2006). 
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governments actively solicit firm participation, and that they depend quite heavily on 
the expertise firms can provide.  
Our case examples were chosen to demonstrate that business-government 
relations have been surprisingly similar across different domains: in a country with a 
long lobbying tradition (the US), an unusual political system that has turned into the 
second most important trading power and lobbying forum (the EU), and an emerging 
economy with a growing importance in multilateral trade negotiations (Brazil). 
Despite the institutional and historical differences in public-private partnerships, trade 
policy lobbying in these three cases systematically diverges from the pressure 
lobbying assumed in the mainstream trade policy literature.4  
Our empirical discussion draws on over 120 qualitative interviews carried out 
with representatives from firms, business associations or governments between 
September 2002 and December 2004.5 We have mainly spoken to firms and business 
associations that have been particularly active on international trade and that have 
invested considerable resources to affect negotiations. The uncertainty, constraints, 
and difficulties mentioned by these business actors can thus be assumed to apply even 
more decisively to smaller and less active firms. 
We proceed in three steps. A first section reviews other recent analyses of the 
multilateral trading system and explains that international trade policymaking 
increasingly includes intense consideration of regulatory issues. A second section 
analyzes how these changes in trade policy affect business-government relations, and 
in particular it distinguishes pressure lobbying from the interactive business-
government relations common in regulatory contexts. A third section illustrates these 
business-government relations with example from trade policy lobbying in the US, the 
EU, and Brazil, focusing on the role of uncertainty, government solicitation and 
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mutual dependence. As a research agenda, the final section then uses the empirical 
discussion to articulate hypotheses about the conditions that determine which 
business-government interactions we should expect in what context. The conclusion 
then clarifies the implications of our distinctions for the study of trade policy-making. 
1. Trade negotiations as regulatory reform 
As early as 1989, Milner and Yoffie (1989: 239-240) remarked that the study 
of business lobbying is trapped in a dichotomy between liberalization and 
protectionism. Following David Ricardo (1817 [1992]), trade was imagined as the 
exchange of goods between two countries with competitive markets where production 
follows from a country’s comparative advantage. Under protectionism, a country 
raises the barriers to entry for foreign goods; under free trade, it abandons these 
barriers and exposes its firms to foreign competition. Multilateral tariff negotiations, 
the reason for which the GATT was created, ensure nothing more than the reciprocal 
reduction of external barriers and consequentially the stakes for the affected firms are 
quite clear.  
This assumption, however, holds true only if all countries have perfectly 
competitive markets on the inside and if their only decisions are whether to open or 
close these markets to foreign competition. This is not necessarily the case. In his 
book, “Beyond Free Trade,” David Yoffie (1993) argues the nature of competition is 
very different if (1) there is a high or a low degree of industry concentration in a 
particular market and (2) government intervention in a sector is intensive or low. 
Yoffie (1993:19) summarizes the diverse nature of the international trading system in 
the following picture. 
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FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The classic international trade model, according to Yoffie, corresponds to the 
lower left-hand box. National markets have few imperfections and government has a 
small role, so that a large number of firms compete based on their comparative 
advantages once trade barriers are reduced. However, Yoffie also identifies three 
other forms of international competition: (1) oligopolitistic competition between large 
firms in liberalized national markets; (2) political competition between two different 
systems of government intervention, and (3) regulated competition, where both firm 
concentration and government intervention is high.   
Yoffie’s characterization corresponds with Cowhey and Aronson’s (1993) 
analysis of global trade. To these authors, trade negotiations previously aimed at 
obtaining a “free trade regime” based on the free movement of goods and national 
comparative advantage. Today, this logic has eroded. Investment has become coequal 
with trade, particularly in emerging countries (Sauvé, 2006), the boundary between 
services and goods is vanishing, and consequentially the modes of trading have 
become more complex. Firms often maintain business operations in foreign countries, 
but are unable to compete on equal footing with national producers due to product or 
process restrictions. The central question is no longer whether to allow free trade with 
a foreign country, but how to ensure market access to a foreign market. Instead of 
following universally applicable rules, these “market access regimes” have to be 
negotiated sector by sector since they  often involve the internationalization or 
harmonization of domestic policies applying to a particular product or service market.  
Quite often, this is a North-South issue as well: Firms in advanced economies can 
only access the markets in emerging economies if they can institute a specific 
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regulatory framework for investment, intellectual property rights, or state 
procurement. While the classic literature has tried to include such restrictions in the 
concept of “non-tariff barriers” to trade, these barriers are often embedded in different 
domestic regulatory approaches or competition policy. Empirical analysis shows that 
domestic regulatory policies and international economic policies are no longer 
independent of each other, as previous models generally assumed.2 
Many of these domestic regulations cannot simply be undone by multilateral 
negotiations. In sectors where regulatory issues are salient, trade negotiations 
therefore attempt to harmonize or to internationalize regulatory standards. Prominent 
examples are service trade negotiations (where market access hinges on qualification 
and licensing requirements), pro-competitive regulation, or universal access 
requirements for health services or transport (Mattoo & Sauvé, 2003). But even trade 
in goods poses the question of internationally applicable production and process 
regulations, such as environmental or labor standards. Intellectual property rights and 
the recent pharmaceutical debates also revolve around what goods can be traded, and 
when. The question is no longer whether  to liberalize trade, but how to liberalize 
trade in a given sector. In sectors where industry concentration and government 
intervention is high, multilateral trade negotiations have become coequal to 
international regulatory reform.  
The transformation of the institutional setting is crucial to understanding this 
evolution. Changes in the international governance of trade have sensibly modified 
the setting which also affects the lobbying of economic actors. The “new trade 
                                                 
2
 Talking about regulation in the context of trade can sometimes lead to confusion. For certain 
economists, the term “regulation” refers to all forms of government intervention and is the bipolar 
opposite of free competition (cf. Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004: 5). For others, regulation refers to 
economic steering executed by independent administrative agencies. More generally, regulation implies 
a set of targeted rules. In this article, we view regulation as “the promulgation of an authorative set of 
rules, accompanied by some mechanism […] for monitoring and promoting compliance with these 
rules,” (Baldwin, Scott, & Hood, 1998: 3). 
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themes” and the refinement of trade policy instruments, such as the WTO dispute 
settlement system and its application on national soil, call for an expertise that was 
less relevant in previous GATT rounds. While the negotiation of regulatory issues 
requires technical knowledge, the judicialization of trade implies a greater demand 
legal expertise. Both cases increase the need for detailed knowledge about market 
barriers (Goldstein & Martin, 2000; De Bièvre, 2004; Shaffer, 2006).  
2. Business-government relations: between pressure and cooperation 
 
How then should we understand business-government relations over 
multilateral trade? In the context of tariff negotiations, lobbying previously has been 
presented as largely dichotomized between protectionism and support for reciprocal 
trade liberalization. Firms or industry representatives had been understood to exert 
pressure on politicians in order to capture the outcome of negotiations. Lobbying over 
trade policy became equated with “rent-seeking” and gave a bad reputation to 
business involvement in politics and trade policy in general (Buchanan et al., 1980; 
Magee, Brock, & Young, 1989).  
In contrast, research on lobbying strategies in the field of business 
administration and international business has tended moved away from this 
dichotomy (e.g. Rugman & Verbeke, 1990; Dunning, 1997). According to business-
centered studies, the stakes in international trade negotiations are foreign investment 
and market access relevant to the strategic positioning of firms. This corresponds with 
the propositions of Yoffie (1993) and Cowhey and Aronson (1993). When multilateral 
trade negotiations are about the formulation of specific targeted rules that define 
market access and operation, business lobbying changes.  
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On the one hand, firms have to affect the details of the rules in question, which 
requires closer cooperation than just pressuring for a general outcome of talks. The 
transmission of information, and not just the provision of electoral or financial 
incentives, becomes an important part of trade policy lobbying (see Potters & Van 
Winden, 1990; Barney, 1991; Austen-Smith, 1993; see also Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 
1963). On the other hand, governments need to negotiate the internationalization of 
domestic regulations, which requires knowledge about the constraints weighing on a 
particular market. Since trade negotiations aim at facilitating the operation of 
business, firms become privileged sources of information for government delegations 
(Coglianese, Zeckhauser, and Parson 2004). Expertise thus proves to be an important 
resource for lobbyists trying to gain access to international trade talks (Radaelli, 
1995). By offering this expertise, firms become part of the epistemic communities that 
thus structure global business regulation (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000). 
The transformation of multilateral trade negotiations has important 
consequences for the political activities of business actors, because it affects their 
political opportunity structure.6 The growing importance of regulatory affairs in 
international trade has profoundly changed the informal procedures and interactions 
between stakeholders. For simple decisions like tariff reductions, economic interest 
groups can offer their financial or electoral support in exchange for decisions in their 
favor. This is no longer the case when regulation becomes a means for governments to 
tie their hands, as in the case of emerging countries like Brazil or South Africa. Many 
current and widely used trade policy instruments rely on highly formalized procedures 
of the WTO; this evolution represents a sharp contrast with previous negotiations on 
tariffs, where demands could be easily formulated and did not require such elaborate 
procedures. Anti-dumping investigations can lead to highly codified retaliations, and 
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the providing the expertise necessary for launching such proceedings is therefore 
increasingly costly for business lobbyists.7  
 Faced with regulatory stakes and increasing legalization, the exchange 
between business and government is therefore based on the exchange of technical 
expertise and legitimacy inter pares. Governments gain information and political 
support, while firms gain access to the elaboration of a policy issue. This shift in 
resources is accompanied by a shift in constraints on lobbying success. Pressure 
lobbying is constrained political competition: many groups try to influence policy-
makers and seek to prevail against each other in order to be heard (Becker, 1983). 
Regulatory trade lobbying rests on government solicitation of expertise, so the criteria 
for success or failure are different. Firms have to prove to the government that they 
are valuable partners, which requires credibility, reputation, and constructive 
cooperation (Broscheid & Coen, 2003; Coen, 2005: 377). Since government 
delegations can shop around for business partners, they can privilege those that are 
perceived to facilitate the consultation process (Willman et al., 2003).  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 1 summarizes the two different types of business-government relations 
on international trade.  Like most classifications, this one highlights two ideal types of 
business-government relations on trade issues. In many contexts, we will find hybrid 
forms. This seems to be particularly true in the case of emerging countries, where 
both types of relations co-exist, partly because of higher stakes in tariffs in not so 
widely liberalized economies. Some firms and economic actors might even use both 
means simultaneously, although a reliance on pressure can harm working relations in 
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the long run. The central point we would like to make is simply that the 
transformation of multilateral trade negotiations that has been observed by many 
authors also has important consequences for business-government relations. The 
insights about regulatory lobbying in the political science and management literature 
thus need to be connected systematically with the changing nature of trade. 
3. Business lobbying on multilateral trade negotiations 
 
For business actors, the new stakes are first and foremost a challenge, because 
the distributive effects of regulatory reform are not as easily predictable as the effects 
of opening or closing markets. Both government negotiators and firm representatives 
need to determine how to transnationalize or harmonize domestic regulation, 
preferably with the greatest possible benefit to the national economy (for government 
representatives) or particular firms (for business representatives). Quite often, 
multiple alternatives and a series of intricate details need to be evaluated, so 
governments solicit industry input and assistance. Firms, in turn, often need a 
considerable amount of time in order to learn and evaluate the impact of a given set of 
negotiations.  
Three aspects of interactive business-government relations are particularly 
important: (1) the greater degree of uncertainty about the stakes for both business and 
government and the learning process that this uncertainty prompts; (2) the active 
solicitation of private actor participation; and (3) the mutual dependence that forms as 
a result of the interaction. These aspects correspond to the changing mode, 
constraints, and resources highlighted in Table 1. We illustrate each of these aspects 
through accounts of business lobbyists and government representatives in the US, the 
EU, and Brazil. 
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3.1. Uncertainty 
The effects of trade policies are often difficult to evaluate due in part to the 
evolution of corporate strategies of individual firms.8 Increasing vertical integration 
and the internationalization of corporate strategies interact with growing complexity 
of trade negotiations and regulation. Many firms find it difficult to catch up with the 
WTO’s agenda, which explains why lobbying during the early years of a trading issue 
is rarely effective. This is particularly true in countries that are newcomers to trade 
liberalization like Brazil.  The internationalization of their economies combined 
traditional and new regulatory issues that demanded extensive learning on the part of 
economic actors. Government officials recall how long it took part of the agricultural 
industry to “professionalize” their demands during the 1990. As one government 
official from Brazil noted: 
The first thing they [the producers] did when confronted to the opening of the 
economy was to ask for subsidies, later they launched a badly-knitten anti-dumping 
procedure, followed by a serious study on tariffs to finally achieve a decent anti-
dumping procedure. It clearly was a learning process but they are now aware of each 
one of trade defense instruments.9 
 
In many way, calling for simple trade protection was a matter of habit, 
sometimes even detrimental to the interests of given sectors, who only learned slowly 
that they could also demand anti-dumping procedures against tier-countries. The same 
Brazilian official recalled:  
During the 1990s, the textile sector was confronted [with] a strong pressure of Chinese 
imports. They [the Brazilian textile branch10] demanded subsidies, but they are now 
demanding an agreement with the EU. This change did not come overnight; the 
evolution of this position took two years to emerge.11 
 
Yet, even though there has been a learning process, the existence of traditional trade 
issues hinders the effective participation of business interests on new regulatory 
issues, which depends in turn both on a critical mass of multi-national firms operating 
on national soil and on efficient branch associations.  
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Moreover, WTO procedures often remain obscure for firms that do not work 
on trade issues continuously. This not only applies to firms from newcomer countries. 
As a representative from a European telecommunications company remembered: 
I have to admit, I only discovered the WTO at the margin. Initially, people considered 
the WTO to be something quite abstract: “value-added”, “basic services” …? In most 
countries, you did not have a realization that there was a new reality… that you 
couldn’t do anything without paying attention to the WTO.12 
Following trade negotiations was just as difficult, as a leading telecom expert from the 
US explained: 
Nobody knew how to read a schedule of commitments. We even had people think 
that ‘- none, -none, -none’ meant that none had market access.13  
To resolve these difficulties, business representatives had to get creative. As one US 
business representative described: 
We developed a sort of code to talk to one another while government representatives 
were in the room. We made sure we would start our phrases by saying ‘Just to review 
a little bit what has been said…’ so that everybody understood what was going on.14 
 Uncertainty on issues and possible outcomes translated into concrete 
apprehensions in the early period. From Brazil’s textile industry to European 
telecommunication firms or American airlines, all business representatives, who at 
one point started following WTO affairs, felt that there was a high risk of being 
traded-off “against bananas.”15 This fear applied not only to firms affected by the 
negotiations on new trade issues; it was also a consequence of increasingly complex 
negotiations on traditional industrial sectors like textile or steel.  
Information on all aspects of negotiations is sometimes difficult to obtain, even 
for government representatives. This is particularly true for emerging countries like 
Brazil. Previous GATT rounds had been conceived as relatively vague and non-
constraining. For a long time, only a few government officials were in charge of these 
negotiations and they had little sense of what the real situation was in each sector once 
they started negotiating under the WTO framework: “We handled little information, 
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and we arrived to the negotiation table with rather impressionistic data.”16 
Consequentially, it was not unusual for business sector representatives to travel all the 
way to Geneva to engage in last–minute lobbying activities, to make up for the 
government’s lack of information, and to make their demands visible. 
3.2. Solicitation 
Firms have not always been the ones who have taken the initiative to follow and 
enter into contact with government negotiators. Quite often, the government made a 
concerted effort to reach out to business, inform them of the stakes of particular 
negotiations, and solicit their help.  
Brazil has undergone a significant change in this matter, in part as a result of 
existing negotiations between the Latin American common market MERCOSUR and 
the US and the EU that required specific negotiating groups to be established. In 
recent years, the Brazilian government has developed an extensive information 
network on trade matters, associated with an increased level of interaction with 
business representatives. In addition to ad hoc committees that existed during the 
former Cardoso government, new formal institutions like the National Council for 
Industrial Development (CNDI) were created to meet on regular basis and encourage 
the widespread participation of regional and sectoral industrial associations. Non-
tariff restrictions, higher technological standards, and expertise have all compelled 
government officials to learn more about production processes, which in turn required 
closer cooperation with business. In the textile sector, for example, the Brazilian 
government turned to business representatives in order to understand production 
processes relevant for trade negotiations.17 
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Moreover, governments in many emerging countries have set up information 
channels to allow at least a minimalist understanding of the functioning of the WTO. 
Increased transparency and a reliable commitment to a long-term trade policy have 
been crucial factors in countries with unstable state structures to convince business 
representatives to invest time and resources in the negotiation process and to engage 
in formally accepted lobby practices (Diniz, 2000).  
The asymmetries of world trade have led the governments of emerging 
economies to search for more detailed knowledge. Although government officials 
working on trade matters became more numerous and were better trained (through the 
creation of a new career path as a specialist in foreign trade), countries consistently 
needed to integrate business input in order to strengthen the national position in the 
increasingly complex negotiations. Indeed, during the negotiation of the Free Trade 
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) and the MERCOSUR-EU association, the 
Brazilian government’s limited number of ill-prepared representatives confronted 
solid teams (“an army”) of US and EU representatives. To make up for this 
asymmetry, Brazilian business representatives were henceforth included on Brazil’s 
negotiation teams, a novelty if we take into account the peculiar isolationist culture of 
foreign trade decisions in this country during the time of MERCOSUR’s launching. 
Last but not least, the transparency associated with these negotiation processes 
(FTAA official forums between government and entrepreneurs) transposed a new 
culture of interaction between government and business on trade matters.  
Yet the active solicitation of business input is not only common in emerging 
economies. Shaffer (2003) has shown this in great detail for the US and the EU. In 
particular, he underlines that the European Commission undertakes “reverse 
lobbying:” it constantly has to contact firms to contact it.  Government representatives 
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on both sides of the Atlantic engage in extensive outreach programs. In the US, the 
government used much of its early contacts with business to “try and inform them 
about why we thought [a particular negotiation] was a good idea.”18 The US 
government had to make an effort to get companies interested: 
If you want a meeting, you call the companies. We didn’t even know who they were, 
so we started casting the net and bringing them in.19  
For government representatives everywhere, consulting with companies was considered 
crucial:  “All trade negotiations are done on behalf of our companies, so it is 
important that there is a continuous back and forth between them and the 
government.”20  
Governments therefore solicit consultation with business experts, even though 
there can be differences between countries. The US administration has for a long time 
asked private sector representatives to join them. According to a European observer, 
sometimes “the US private sector delegation would be as large as the government 
delegation.”21 A US business representative confirmed that, “if you are a significant 
American company, a lot of times the government might ask you to be part of the 
delegation.”22  
In Europe, the Commission also tries to work with business representatives but 
often find firms surprisingly uninterested. According to one US business 
representative, “[t]he difference is that governments [in Europe] are not used to 
working with industry. And industry is not used to working with them […] except in 
the UK.”23  Nonetheless, the Commission tries quite actively to involve business 
representatives, not the least reason being that it needs to keep up with the wealth of 
technical information that the US government can provide due to its business 
consultation. A representative of an EU business association explained: “Quite often, 
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the Commission will approach us to keep them informed about market barriers 
encountered: ‘If you have a problem, please tell us!’”24 
Indeed, the Commission has made an enormous effort to cooperate more 
closely with business representatives in order to obtain technical expertise necessary 
to keeping up with their American counterparts. This effort has led to the creation of 
the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) in 1995 and smaller associations such as 
the European Service Forum, where European business leaders were given a chance to 
enter into contact and consultation with Commission officials (Cowles, 2001; Pollack 
& Shaffer, 2001). At the opening of the European Service Forum, former European 
trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan (1999) underlined: 
I am in your hands to listen to what your objectives are. . . . I count on your support 
and input . . . so that we can refine our strategy and set out clear, priority negotiating 
objectives, which will make a difference in the international expansion of business. 
For firms that want to work with the Commission, however, these forums imply a 
very particular kind of logic. Since the Commission can decide to consider or ignore 
business input, firms need to make constructive suggestions that help increase the 
Commission’s political decisions. For the Association of European Airlines (AEA), 
this logic was quite noticeable: 
AEA represents very diverse interests. The only agreement they can find is 
liberalization. In Europe, what is possible is finding the common good. That’s the 
reason why the position papers of AEA are almost ‘extremist’ – I say this without any 
negative connotation. They are radical; they push the logic to their very end. That’s 
understandable. When you demand very specific things, you cannot always choose 
what you obtain [in the end]. And they do not want to give birth to Frankenstein.25 
Moving beyond lobbying for individual benefits is advantageous to business 
because it ensures a good working relationship with the Commission. In the US, the 
logic is similar. Studying service trade lobbying by large US financial companies, 
Yoffie and Bergenstein (1985) suggest that American Express built “political capital” 
by developing an issue which had broad political appeal and fit into the agendas of 
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key politicians, even though the significance of the issue for American Express’ 
business operations was not certain.  
Studying government solicitation is thus important for understanding what is 
demanded and supplied in a public-private partnership on international trade. Unlike 
the exchange model assumed in the traditional economic models, firms do not just 
exchange votes or money in order to lobby against regulation. Rather, they offer 
expertise and political support in exchange for access to the elaboration of specific 
stakes (see Bouwen, 2002). 
3.3. Mutual dependence 
The business-government relationships that have formed over time have turned 
out to be quite stable, at least on certain issues. As a representative from AT&T 
explained:  
When I started [in 1992] it was more formal. We scheduled appointments to go see 
the government. Now we just talk. There has been less face-to-face and more e-
mailing.26  
A government representative from the telecommunications sector confirmed, 
“it is a quite close knit telecom community in Washington, so we know who handles 
which issues.”27 In some cases, business representatives will continue to keep up their 
political contacts, even though they are not really interested in the current stakes. A 
European business representative qualified: “I don’t really work on WTO affairs; I 
only participate in [the European association’s] working group. We just try to follow 
what is going on.”28 Business representatives believe that somehow this political 
activity can pay off, even if their premier interests lie elsewhere. A representative 
from Spain’s Telefónica explained: 
In a way, the WTO was a very welcome way to seize this opportunity more fully. But 
the main initiative was investment, not our political representation. In business, you 
first try to open up new markets and then you start thinking about politics. For us, the 
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WTO was an opportunity to assure that what we have put in place would continue in 
the adequate political framework.29 
In other words, political activity of firms in the government-created forums 
can at times be quite low. A European association representative working on the 
WTO even described its strategy as “a night train: there was a locomotive, some work 
cars and many sleeping cars.”30 Still, business-government relations continue to hold 
because they are mutually beneficial for both sides. Governments have access to 
technical information needed for multilateral talks and businesses have access to the 
policy process, which is highly valuable once they find that they need to express their 
opinion on a topic. A German business representative emphasized: “[W]e always try 
to be in unison with our government. It is never useful not to be in unison with our 
government.”31  
As these close business-government relationships have become more common, 
expectations in emerging countries have risen that equally tight cooperation could 
emerge. But these expectations were sometimes frustrated. As the costs of continued 
business-government cooperation sometimes outweighs its benefits to governments in 
emerging countries, firms could not always count on being consulted and informed, 
like their counterparts in the US and the EU. In Brazil, as in other developing 
countries, the institutional settings and unbalanced relations between a strong state 
and a weak entrepreneurial class have created a similar lack of information.32 Firms 
therefore followed WTO issues independently, resorting sometimes to extensive 
networks throughout the world where they can obtain information and pass it on to 
their local branches.  
In many countries, however, business and government started cooperating 
regularly in order to keep up with the often extensive delegations from such countries 
as the US or the EU. As Stopford and Strange (1991) have suggested, international 
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trade negotiation often turns into a competition between countries for world market 
shares. For governments, obtaining such share crucially depends on their continuous 
cooperation with national firms. The dependence of firms on governments is then 




These examples show, first, that uncertainty is high in business-government 
relations on trade policy issues that go beyond multilateral tariff negotiations. 
Uncertainty, in turn, implies that business representatives depend much more on their 
government counterparts than one would expect from the traditional literature on 
pressure groups. Second, government representatives are not simply the object of 
industry pressure; they actively solicit cooperation with business actors in order to 
obtain valuable technical expertise needed for the multilateral negotiations. This 
solicitation, in turn, comes with a new set of selection criteria of business partners. 
For example, the success of firms might depend on whether they can signal 
successfully that there are credible and reliable partners for government consultation. 
Third, the mutual dependence of business and government in the context of trade 
negotiations can lead to stable working relationships that can resemble a symbiosis or 
a particular form of national cooperation rather than pressure lobbying.  
4. Research agenda 
While we refer to the traditional type of business-government interaction as 
pressure lobbying, and to the newer type as regulatory trade lobbying or interactive 
relations, we would like to underline that both types are lobbying. That is, both 
involve the attempt by private actors to influence the decision of political actors in 
 22
their favor.  In the pursuit of their interests, firms nonetheless behave differently under 
pressure lobbying and regulatory lobbying.  In regulatory contexts, firms are highly 
aware that their access to the decision-makers depends on being selected as a policy 
partner. They therefore have to signal that they are constructive consultants that can 
help increase the legitimacy of governmental decisions. This is done most effectively 
if firms are perceived to be not just self-interested, but if they propose general 
solutions. As Broscheid and Coen (2003) have argued for the European context, 
lobbyists therefore have to strike a delicate balance between arguing for their 
immediate interest and making more general ‘public interest’ arguments that will gain 
them access to the policy-process.  
These observations help us to specify several hypotheses about when we 
should expect what kind of behavior in the context of multilateral trade negotiations. 
We have seen that an understanding of the stakes and a capacity to evaluate the pay-
offs of negotiations is crucial to trade policy lobbying, which leads us to the first set 
of hypotheses: 
1. When the stakes are clear, firms are more likely to try to exert 
pressure on their government representatives. Inversely, when the 
stakes are difficult to evaluate, firms will prefer to engage in 
consultation procedures.  
Government solicitation furthermore plays an important role and varies 
depending on whether the issue that is negotiated multilaterally. Our second set of 
hypotheses therefore points to the way in which the degree of solicitation is connected 
with the resources business actors can employ for their lobbying efforts:   
2. Solicitation is most likely when trade negotiations require technical 
expertise. When governments do not need to obtain technical expertise 
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from firms, lobbying will rely more heavily on financial and electoral 
support and possibly public opinion.  
The discretion that governments have in selecting private partners depends, in turn, on 
the institutional setting and the policy process of each country. Since it is generally 
deemed undesirable that government consults exclusively with business, many 
countries prescribe specific consultation procedures, which can in turn affect the 
competition between groups for access. Our third hypothesis connects the constraints 
in different settings with the most likely lobbying behavior:   
3. When the policy process ensures through formal procedures that all 
stake-holders can participate, competition between groups will lead to 
more aggressive lobbying styles. Inversely, when access depends on the 
informal selection of business representatives by their respective 
governments, firms are more likely to enter into constructive 
cooperation. 
Finally, we refer to recent studies on lobbying to limit this third hypothesis.  As 
Naurin (2004) has shown, corporate lobbyists can chose to exert pressure when they 
feel that their clients or association members are watching them. In cases where 
lobbying is delegated from firms to a business association (or even from firms to a 
relatively autonomous in-house lobbying department), lobbyists will be careful not 
make too many concessions to governments if the principals can monitor their entire 
work efforts. Under highly transparent procedures, lobbyists will continue to promote 
their immediate self-interests even if this implies less access in order not to anger the 
members of the business associations or their superiors (see also Coglianese, 
Zeckhauser, and Parson 2004). 
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4. Accepting a trade-off between lobbying for one’s immediate interest 
and lobbying for a public solution in order to gain access is most likely 
when transparency is low, however this assumption does not hold true 
in cases of pervasive rent-seeking relations. Inversely, under high 
transparency, aggressive self-interested lobbying might occur, even 
when governments have certain discretion over the selection of their 
business partners.  
These four sets of hypotheses remain to be tested and articulated more systematically. 
They are merely suggested here in order to clarify our observations and to move 
beyond a distinction of two fixed types of lobbying behavior. By specifying four 
hypotheses about the origins and components of our two types, we hope to indicate 
that the two might evolve or mix when the basis on which they rest changes.  
Conclusion 
This paper is motivated by a frustration with theoretical models of business-
government relations in the context of multilateral trade negotiations. While empirical 
studies of corporate political activities acknowledge a variety of lobbying methods 
and motivations, theoretical accounts of trade policy quite often rely on the simplified 
models that postulate business pressure for open or closed markets only. These 
models, however, rely on an outdated conception of the stakes of international trade 
negotiations. We have therefore attempted to bring together recent insights about the 
nature of multilateral trade talks with an analysis of business-government relations. 
By pointing out that regulatory stakes and the legalization of trade create 
different kinds of business-government interactions, we caution against hasty 
conclusions about the power and influence of firms in international trade. When firms 
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are solicited partners of governmental trade delegations, they do not necessarily wield 
the same influence as they do under successful pressure lobbying. Observing an 
increase in business participating on trade issues therefore does not necessarily imply 
that firms control multilateral trade talks (cf. Wallach & Sforza, 1999). On the 
contrary, the shift towards regulatory negotiations means that businesses have to 
master greater detail in order to capture a government’s decision, and working on so 
many details at the same time can even be a risk for them. In some cases, firms are 
uncertain of the real effects of their actions and prefer to engage only moderately in 
on-going talks, so as “not to give rise to Frankenstein.”  
All in all, by distinguishing between business-government relations on tariff 
negotiations and on regulatory or legal issues, we do not want to suggest that the 
newer issues have entirely replaced pressure lobbying with regulatory lobbying. We 
simply call for a more nuanced treatment of business-government relations in trade 
policy analyses that considers the effects of different multilateral stakes on business 
















Oligopolistic Competition Regulated Competition 
Comparative Advantage Political Competition 
 Low        High 
Government Intervention 
 
Table 1: Two types of business-government relations 
 
pressure lobbying on trade regulatory trade lobbying  
goal of multilateral 
negotiations 
opening/closing of domestic 
markets to foreign goods 
internationalization of regulatory 
regimes in order to facilitate 
trade and trans-border operations 
typical means for 
achieving goal tariffs or non-tariff barriers 
regulatory reform or creation of 
international regulatory standards 
stake for economic actors demands for or against market-
opening 
participating in the elaboration of 
targeted rules specifying how to 
liberalize 
lobbying mode exerting pressure, consultation consultation, cooperation 
principal resource political support (financial or 
electoral) technical expertise 
principal constraint competition between groups 
dependence on government 








 Earlier versions have been presented at the Third ECPR General Conference in Budapest in 
September 2005 and during a workshop on “Trade, regulation and non-governmental actors” at the 
Institut d’Etudes Politiques and the Centre d’Etudes en Relations Internationales (CERI) in Paris in 
June 2004. We would like to thank David Levi-Faur, Nicolas Jabko, the participants of the two panels 
and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. 
2
 Others have furthermore studied which institutional conditions allow industry demands to be more or 
less successful (O'Halloran, 1994; Lohmann & O'Halloran, 1994; Gilligan, 1997) In these account, 
industry lobbying might not have an impact on trade policy, but only because politicians were 
sufficiently insulated from industry pressure or because firms were unable to act collectively.  
3
 Safeguards still remain a popular target of lobbying activities by sectoral groups. Import duties 
applied by the US government on March 2002 on steel imports or the activity of European textile 
producers confronted to Chinese imports are among the latest.  
4
 The reader interested in the differences between the three political systems may turn to Shaffer (2003) 
and Schneider (2004). 
5
 Almost all interviews have been conducted in the native language of the interviewees. For simplicity, 
the quotes used in the following text have been translated into English by the authors. 
6
 By political opportunity structure, we mean the configuration of resources, formal and informal 
institutional arrangements and historical precedents that facilitate or constrain the access of non-
governmental actors to the policy process (Kitschelt, 1986: 58). 
7
 An interesting counter-example of this trend can be found in the difficulties that certain accessing 
countries have in implementing the WTO agenda: in the rather obscure lobby opportunity structure of 
Russia, big rent-seeking industrial groups will resist trade liberalization on grounds of protectionism, 
but also because they apprehend the costs of an increased transparency of the process (see Peregudov 
1999). 
8
 For instance, in Brazil’s textile sector foreign firms operating on national soil during the 1990s did not 
support liberalizing policies due to their world corporate strategy, and this even though the sector 
remained competitive at an international level. 
9
 Interview with a government official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brasilia, September 2002.  
10
 The authors refers here to individual firms and specifically to existing branch associations at the 




 Interview with a representative from Deutsche Telekom, July 2003.  
13
 Interview with a US business representative, Washington, D.C., 2 July 2003. ‘None’ answers the 




 Interviews in Brussels, Washington and São Paulo, November 2002, July 2003 and June 2003 
respectively. 
16
 Interview with a Brazilian government representative, Brasilia, 15 September 2002.  
17
 Interview with several textile representatives during 2002-2003.   
18
 Interview with a US government representative, Washington, D.C., 20 June 2003. 
19
 Interview with a US government representative, Washington, D.C., 18 June 2003. 
20
 Interview with a US government representative, Washington, D.C. 20 June 2003. Very similar 
statement were made by representatives from the European Commission and the Council Secretariat. 
21
 Interview, Brussels, 3 September 2003.  
22
 Interview with a US telecom operator, Washington, D.C., 25 June 2003.  
23
 Interview with a US based telecommunication service provider, Washington, D.C., 25 June 2003.  
24
 Interview in Brussels, 14 February 2003.  
25
 Interview with an official from the European Commission, 21 October 2003.  
26
 Interview with a US telecom provider, Washington, D.C., 24 June 2003.  
27
 Interview, Washington, D.C., 18 June 2003.  
28
 Telephone interview on 22 October 2003.  
29
 Telephone interview, 5 November 2003. 
30
 Interview in Brussels, 3 September 2003. 
31
 Interview with a European airline representative, 18 November 2002.  
32
 Business representatives of MTN textile firms in Brazil acknowledged that their branch was not 
always informed of issues being negotiated and that it was not uncommon for them to activate their 
MTN networks and to receive expertise from other subsidiary firms. 
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